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PO SSESSO R Y  T IT L E  T O  W IL D E R N E SS LAND
David M. Harley*
The acquisition of title to wilderness land through adverse
Í>ossession is of special interest to New Brunswick lawyers. In the irst place this branch of the law had its beginnings in the very 
early jurisprudence of the Province. A leading case, Doe d. Des 
Barres v. W h ite/1 was decided in 1842. Secondly, a number of the 
leading cases have been decisions of the New Brunswick courts 
or have originated here.2 Thirdly, the development of this branch 
of the law was strongly influenced bv decisions of United States 
courts. The American courts first drew the distinction between 
cultivated and wilderness land. They also developed the theory 
of colour of title. In the absence of relevant English authorities 
our courts turned quite naturally to the American cases.3 Fourthly, 
the recognition by the Courts that an actual possession of wild­
erness land can be shown and will suffice to establish title to the 
land itself provides an excellent jurisprudential illustration of the 
very broad meaning given to the word “possession” in different 
branc.ies of the law. In the eves of the law d man may be deemed 
to be in actual possession of a tract of wild land when the degree 
of actual occupation and physical control is very slight.4 Finally, 
the subject, despite its long history and the numerous decided 
eases, has definite practical importance even today. Much of the 
land in New Brunswick has remained uncleared and uncultivated 
so that practitioners must frequently consider the subject in real 
estate transactions.
Although there have been many cases on the matter includ­
ing several decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, it still 
cannot be said that the law is settled. The rules adopted by the 
courts have never been clearly and precisely formulated and sever­
al important questions have scarcelv been discussed. The pur­
pose of this article is to re-examine this branch of the law and to 
state the law as it now stands.
Yerv early in the 19th century American courts drew a dis­
tinction between cultivated and wilderness land when considering 
questions of possessory title and it was soon adopted by our
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courts/’ Since so much of the land in North America was unsett­
led wild land, the distinction was a necessary and valuable one. 
It is not found in the earlier English law for the very good reason 
that most of the land in England was settled and enclosed. This 
does not mean that there is no authority in English law for draw­
ing distinctions of this sort. English judges have recognized that 
the evidence necessary to prove possession must vary in relation 
to the nature of the thing that is to be possessed. A notable 
example of this judicial attitude is found in the House of Lords 
case o iT h e  Lord Advocate v. Lord Lovat.6 This case involved a 
dispute over the title to certain fishing rights on a river in Scot­
land. The defendant claimed title by virtue of continuous long 
user and enjoyment. Although title to land was not directly in 
issue, the observations of the House were of the most general 
nature and made in the broadest terms. Lord O ’Hagan said:
As to possession, it must Ih; considered in every case with 
reference to the pecu liar circum stances. The acts, im plying  
possession in one case, m ay be wholly inadequate to prove it 
in anoth er. T h e  ch aracter and value of the prop erty , the suit­
able and n atu ral m ode of using it, the course of conduct 
which the p rop rietor m ight reasonably be expected to follow  
with a due regard to his own interests —  all these things, 
greatly varying as they m ust, under various conditions, are  
to be taken into account in determ in ing the sufficiency of a 
possession.7
Observations of a similar nature may be found in two Privy Coun­
cil cases, Des Barres and another v. Sheys and Kirby v. Cowderoy9. 
These cases involved disputes over wild lands in Nova Scotia and 
British Columbia.
W hile Canadian courts have recognized titles to wilderness 
land based on adverse possession, their approach to the subject 
has on the whole been a cautious one. It is perhaps a significant 
fact that in most of the leading cases the claim to a possessory 
title failed.10 The reason for this timidity is the desire of the 
courts to protect security of title which they consider the main 
interest of the community in disputes involving the title to land. 
An owner should only be deprived of his land in a clear and 
obvious case and the fact that he chooses to leave his land un­
used and unoccupied should not prejudice his rights. The courts 
will only divest him of his title if another person has established 
and can prove an actual possession of the land adverse to the 
owner.
F.g. D oc (1. Des Italics v. Wliitt (1842) 3 N .B .R . r>9.r>.
(». (1879) L .R 5 App ('.as. 273.
7. Ib id ,  at p. 288.
8. (1875) 29  1,. r. i>92.
9, i 1912] A.C.. :>99.
N .B .R . '»9.V. Nh crre n  v. Pearson10 F .g . Doc d. D< v Unties W hite (1842) 3
(1887) 1 1 Si.C.R . .*>81; W ood  i». / .cliliiiK (1904) 34 S.C..R. 027: F u rrtn  v.
Pcjr/LHot P’n/it r C.om¡Kiny cl at (1933) 3 M.IVR. Util.
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Security of title is also the main consideration underlying 
the Limitation Acts.11 These Acts were designed to cut down, in 
the community interest, disputes involving title to land. This is 
achieved by limiting the time within which disputes of this sort 
can be commenced and by recognizing the validity of titles based 
simply upon actual possession or the land for the necessary statu­
tory period.
The courts also protect securitv of title by placing the burden 
of proving an actual possession of land on the person claiming 
possessory title. The burden is a heavy one and against it is the 
presumption that the true owner remains in possession of his 
land even if he has ceased to occupy it unless in the meantime 
someone else has entered and dispossessed him.12
Although the main concern of our courts has been to pro­
tect security of title, they have been prepared to make certain 
concessions in favour of the person claiming possessory title. Thus 
they recognized that title to wilderness land could be acquired 
through adverse posssesion and that an actual possession of wild­
erness land could be shown by evidence short of clearing and 
enclosure of the land. They also made concessions in favour of 
the person possessing wilderness land under a colourable or 
defective title. These concessions were a direct result of the 
external circumstances existing in North America. Much of the 
land was uncleared wild land which was settled and cleared only 
gradually. Often it was left uncleared as it was unsuitable for 
cultivation and could best be used in its natural state as a source 
of wood supply. It was not a general practice to fence and enclose 
the whole of one’s land. W ith this external situation in mind 
should the true owner always be free to rebut a claim to possess­
ory title merely bv showing that throughout the statutory period 
his land had remained uncleared and unenclosed? Or, to put it 
differently, should security of title be protected at all costs even 
in circumstances where the possessor could show a possession as 
complete as the nature of the land permitted or that he had used 
and occupied the land in the same manner and to the same 
extent as the true owner could have done had he chosen to make 
full use of his land? Our courts took the sensible view that the 
degree of actual possession necessary must be related to the char­
acter of the land in dispute and they made concessions in favour 
of the possessory claimant. It remains uncertain how far these 
concessions go and indeed it is a difficult question how far they
11. In New Brunswick the relevant statu te is the L im itation  of Actions Act. 
R .S .N .B . 19."»2, c. 133, which by section 29 provides: “ N o person shall 
take proceedings to recover any land hut within iwentv years next 
after the tim e at which the right to do so first accrued . . .”
12. On this point see the rem arks of M acO uarrie, }. in F.zhridv i’. Plialrit
I9')8| 11 IVI..R. (2d) «»U.
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should go as security of title would be jeopardized if too great 
a relaxation in favour of the possessor were permitted.
The cases on possessory title to wilderness land can be divid­
ed into two main groups:
(1) those in which a squatter claims possessory title; and
(2) those in which someone having “colour of title” claims 
possessory title.
Squatter Claiming Possessory Title
W here a squatter claims possessory title the rule is that he 
must prove an actual possession of the land for a continuous 
period of more than twentv years — a possession open, notorious 
and exclusive —  and, as in the case of cultivated land, the acquis­
ition of title is confined to that part of the wilderness land 
actually possessed. A squatter can claim nothing in relation to his 
possession by construction as the law will not favour a wrong­
doer. The question immediately arises: what must a squatter prove 
in order to establish an actual possession of wilderness land? This 
question was first considered by the New Brunswick courts in 
Doe d. Des Barres v. White. 13
The facts in this case were as follows. More than 30 years 
before the commencement of the action, the defendant settled 
on land owned by the lessor of the plaintiff. He cleared part of 
the land fronting on the Memramcook River, built a house on 
this cleared portion and lived there continuously. It was conceded 
that the defendant had acquired title to the cleared land, and 
title to it was not disputed in the action. The dispute concerned 
a large tract of wilderness land extending back from the edge of 
the cleared land to a ridge approximately three miles from the 
river and running parallel to it. The boundary lines of this wild 
land had not been surveyed until 1831. It was argued for the de­
fendant, however, that the ridge running along the rear of the 
locus in quo constituted a sufficient boundary, and, as he had 
intended to occupy up to this ridge a lot having the same width 
as his cleared land on the river, that the absence of side lines was 
unimportant.
As evidence of his actual occupation of the wild land, the 
defendant proved that for a period of more than twenty years he 
had entered from time to time to cut and remove firewood, logs 
and poles and to make rough wood roads. The wood cutting was 
not systematic as the defendant merely cut enough wood to 
supply his needs as they arose.
13. (1842) 3 N .B .R . 595.
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Parker, J. said that this was the first time that the Supreme 
Court had had to consider what constituted an actual possession 
of wilderness land. In the absence of English authorities he 
examined the American cases at length and concluded that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish an actual possession of the 
land and therefore the defendant’s claim failed. He said at page
. . .  I must confess after weighing and exam in in g the evidence  
with the greatest care , I think the proof falls very far short of 
m aking ou t the necessary requisites of an adverse possession of 
tw enty y ears .n
The ridge running along the rear of the locus in quo, was too 
vague a feature to constitute a boundary line. There was nothing
to give notice to the owner that the defendant claimed the land,
Parker, J., did say that if the evidence had been stronger the 
defendant might have succeeded, and he did not close the door 
to possessory claims based upon evidence of this sort. He said:
If however the repeated acts of cu ttin g  and taking away 
trees openly, notoriously, and exclusively com m itted  by one  
person, with the knowledge of the ow ner, o r under such c ir ­
cum stances as th at he cann ot be presum ed to be ignorant of 
th em , and w ithout in terru p tion  on his p art, will ripen into  
actu al possession of the soil, one of two things would seem  
fu rth er required , nam ely, th at the land over which the claim  
extends shall be defined, eith er by m arks and l>ounds upon  
th e land itself, o r by some deed or instrum ent under colour  
of which the party has en tered ; and th at to m ake ou t a poss­
ession of tw enty years d u ration , th ere m ust have been sufficient 
acts of this sort com m itted  before the com m encem ent of th at 
period, and not m erely while it was running on. It is also 
m aterial to show distinctly th at all the acts of cu ttin g  relied  
on have been done by the p arty  him self or by others under 
his d irection , or th at th ere be at least the sam e degree of 
certain ty  on this point as would be required to m ake him  
answ erable in an action of trespass.13
The Des Barres case was followed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Sherren v. Pearson ,10 on appeal from the Supreme 
Court of Prince Edward Island. The facts in Sherren v. Pearson 
were similar to those in the Des Barres case. The dispute con­
cerned the title to wild woodland situated between properties 
owned by the defendant and the plaintiff. The jury decided that 
the plaintiff had legal title to the disputed land and the defend­
ant then sought to establish title by adverse possession. The def-
636:
14. Ib id ,  a t p. (¡30.
15. I h id . at p. 632-633.
16. (1887) 14 S.C .R . SSI.
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aidant had not fcnccd the land nor cut boundaries, but it was 
dearly identifiable as it was bounded on its northern and south­
ern sides by two roads which converged at or near the other two 
boundaries. The evidence of actual possession was that the def­
endant and others through whom he claimed possession cut wood 
and poles on the land for a period exceeding twenty years. The 
Court, after reviewing with approval the Des Banes case, rejected 
Ihe defendant’s claim. Ritchie, C. J., said:
I ht* m ere acts of going on wilderness land from  tim e to tim e  
in th e absence of the ow ner, and cu ttin g  logs or poles, are  
not such acts, in them selves, as would deprive the ow ner of 
his possession. Such acts a rc  m erely trespasses on the land  
against the tru e ow ner, w hoever he m ay be, w hich any oth er  
in tru d er m ight com m it. T h e re  was no occup ation  of the lot by 
the defendant; th ere  was nothing sufficiently notorious and  
open to give the tru e ownei notice of the hostile possession 
begun. An entry and cu ttin g  a load of poles or a lot of wood, 
being itself a m ere act of trespass, cannot be exten ded beyond 
the lim it of the act done, and a naked possession cann ot be 
extended by construction  beyond the lim its of the actu al 
occup ation , th at is to say, a w rongdoer can claim  n oth in g in 
relation to his possession by co n stru ctio n .>7
Thus in the two leading eases of squatters claiming possess­
ory title to wilderness land the claim railed. W hat conclusions 
can be drawn from these cases?
The first conclusion is that mere evidence of woodcutting 
011 the land will not of itself suffice to establish an actual poss­
ession of the land itself. This is a sensible conclusion. \\ ood- 
cutting could easily be carricd out 011 another’s land for the statu­
tory period without the owner having notice of it. And even if 
the owner has notice, is he to assume that someone else is claim­
ing his land or merely that someone has been stealing his trees? 
Moreover, woodcutting by its very nature cannot be continuous 
and cannot be carricd out over the whole of the wild land at the 
same time. In the Des Bar res case Parker, J., did suggest that re­
peated cutting, if begun well before the twenty year period and 
if accompanied bv the cutting and maintaining of boundary' lines, 
would be sufficient to establish actual possession of the land it­
self, but in 110 case has this suggestion been followed.
The second conclusion is that a squatter can show actual 
possession of wild land bv evidence short of actual clearing and 
enclosure of the land itself. This proposition is not affirmatively 
stated in either ease but it is surely a legitimate inference from 
them. As to clearing of the land, it was not suggested in either 
case that this was necessary. Much wild land is unsuitable for 
clearing and cultivation, so it would be unreasonable to require 
it to be cleared, especially sincc it can no longer be enjoyed if it is.
17. Ib id , at p. 58(>.
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1 here is 110 decisive authority on the point of enclosure. A 
squatter must establish boundaries of some sort but the cases do 
not say lie must enclose bv fencing. Parker, J., clearly did not 
think it was neccssary. In explaining the Des Barres case in the 
later ease of Humphreys v. Helmes, he said:
T h a t cast* <li<l not decide, that th ere could be no adverse  
possession of land not enclosed by fences, nor brought into  
actu al cu ltivation ; but th at, if the defendant relied sim ply on 
acts of possession, o r  the cu ttin g  down and taking away trees 
off of land, on which he entered w ithout deed o r  defined  
bounds, it was not the first act of cu ttin g , th at m ade the  
com m encem ent of the possession, but there m ust be such a 
con tin u an ce and extension of the acts, as would clearly indicate  
the intention to occupy, and not m erely to trespass, before the  
S tatu te  would begin to run: and these must be judged of by 
a jury.IK
There are two Ontario cases11’ which say that enclosure is not 
required, although in these cases the possessor had colour of 
title. The weight of American authority is against the need for 
enclosure.20 Apart from the authorities, it would be unreasonable 
to require enclosure when a squatter claims possessory title of 
wild lands as it is not a general practice to enclose lands of this 
nature.
The question left unanswered by the Des Barres case and by 
Sherren v. Pearson is what further evidence in addition to the 
woodcutting would have sufficed. Suppose for example the defend­
ant in the Des Barres case cut and maintained boundary lines 
around the locus in quo for the statutory period, keeping out tres­
passers and cutting wood within the defined area for more than 
twenty years. Would this evidence coupled with the defendant’s 
actual clearing and occupation of the land fronting on the river 
have been sufficient to give him actual possession of the wilder­
ness land? The extent of the wilderness land would be clearly 
identifiable and there would be ample notice of the possession 
to the outside world. The maintenance of the boundary lines 
would provide the element of continuity lacking in the periodic 
woodcutting. There is no injustice to the owner who has suffic­
ient notice of the possessor’s claim. Security of title would not 
be endangered as the limits of the possession are fixed. As the 
cases now stand our courts are free to say that in these circum­
stances an actual possession of the land is shown. If thev are not 
prepared to take this view, then it is nonsense to talk about 
squatters obtaining possessory title to wilderness land as they 
would seldom be able to show an actual possession greater than 
this.
18. < 18(>I) It) N .B .R . .")!». at p. 71.
19. H ry la n d  v. Scott (I8<>9) 19 IJ.C.C..!’ . Hi"»; Dnx'is v. H ettd-rsou  (I8(>9) 
29  U .C .Q .B . 344.
29. C .J.S .. vol. 2 . p. r*39.
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Persons Having Colour of Title Claiming Possessory Title
The second group of cases are those in which the claimant 
has “colour of title” to the wild land. The phrase “colour of title” 
means that the possessor, unlike a squatter, entered the land by 
virtue of some documentary title to it, which, unknown to the 
possessor, is defective and invalid. A person may have sold him 
land to which he had no title. An incapacitated person may have 
given a deed. The importance of colour of title is that the poss­
essor has some document containing a description of the land 
intended to be conveyed and to be occupied by the possessor and, 
since the possessor is not a trespasser, constructive effect can be 
given to his acts of possession. The rule is that if a person having 
colour of title can show actual possession of part of the wild land 
for the statutory period— a possession open, notorious, continuous 
and exclusive—his possession, in the absencc of possession by 
someone else, is constructively deemed to apply to the whole of 
the land dcscribcd in his defective document of title.
This doctrine first emerged in the United States and was later 
adopted by the Canadian courts. The following statement from 
the Corpus Juris explains the underlying basis of the doctrine:
T h e  idea of constructive possession by virtu e of co lo u r of 
title  is native to the U n ited  States, being devoid of any basis 
in the p rio r English Law , and being originally based upon  
pioneer custom s and necessities, w hereby land was originally  
cleared  and enclosed only gradually and a little  at a tim e, so 
t h 't  the fact of possession was referable to  the p ap er title, 
for discovery of the exten t of the claim , instead of. and as a 
substitute for, the clearings and enclosures of m ore settled  
com m unities. T h e  passing of pioneer days has not, how ever, 
resulted in a discarding of the rule as one no longer adapted  
to  present needs but in the assignm ent for it of th e broad er  
reason th at one entering and holding under colour of title  
th ereb y asserts an intention to possess and claim  all of the  
land w ithin the boundaries of his docu m en t of title , his entry  
un d er such in stru m en t being exp lan ato ry  of his acts and  
resolving any doubt as to  th eir purpose and ten or.‘-1
Since defects are often encountered in the title to wild lands the 
importance of colour of title is immediately apparent: as long 
as the possessor has colour of title he can prove possessory title to 
the whole of his land merely by establishing his actual possession 
of part.
The Canadian courts have accepted the doctrine22 although 
there are 110 leading decisions where it has been applied. It was
21. Ibid, p. 771.
22. V id e ’. fs s s e e  of C a n a rd  v. tw in e  i 1853) 2  X .S .R . 31; D oe d. B a xter  x>. 
lia xter  (18">8) 9  N .B .R . 131; H ey la n d  v. Scott (1860) 19 U .C .C .P . 16?f; 
Ititu /p ln cx ', i>. H e ! m is  (1861) 1!) N .B .R . 59; Davis i>. H en d erso n  (1869) 
29 L .C .Q .B . 3-14; M ulliol n n d  i>. C onklin  (1872) 22  U .C .C .P . 372; Stewart 
n. d o ss  (1933) 6 M .F R . 72; and the tw o Privy C ou ncil cases, Dt-s liar res 
i.nd a n o th er  v. Sliey H 873) 29  L .T . 392 and Kirt>y v. C ow deroy  [1912] 
A.C. 599.
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recognized, discussed, but not applied by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Wood v. LeBlavc in 1904.-H The doctrine does involve 
theoretical difficulties as apparently there are two competing con­
structive possessions: that of the owner who remains in possess­
ion of his land until actually dispossessed, and that of the poss­
essor who has taken actual possession of part of the land. The 
early applications of the doctrine have also been judicially critic- 
ized.-4 In the two leading New Brunswick cases 011 the doctrine,-5 
the attempt to rely upon it failed, not because the courts refused 
to recognize it, but because in each case the defendant failed to 
prove tne actual possession of part of the land for the statutory 
period which is an essential prerequisite of its application.
A recent case where the doctrine was applied is the case of 
Stewart v. G<m.(26,Here the defendant claimed possessory title to
110 acres of woodland in Charlotte County which his father had 
purchased in good faith from a non-owner in 1872. A deed was 
given but not registered, owing to some irregularity in its execu­
tion. The deed was subsequently lost although the plaintiff did 
know of its existence. In 1872 the defendant’s predecessors entered 
the property and began clearing it until 30 to 40 acres were clear­
ed and fenced. Between 1872 and 1900 this cleared portion was 
cultivated by the defendant’s predecessors. After 1900 the cleared 
land lay idle and from time to time the defendant cut pulpwood 
on the property. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal applied 
the theory of colour of title and held that in the 1890’s a possess- 
orv title had been acquired to the whole of the locus in quo 
therebv extinguishing tne plaintiff’s right to institute the pres­
ent action.
The leading New Brunswick case 011 colour of title is Wood, 
v. LcB lanc.27 Tne plaintiff who commenced an action of replevin 
for wrongfully removing logs from wild woodland could not show 
a valid documentary title to the land because his predecessors had 
purchased it from a squatter. The plaintiff then relied on poss­
essory title. The evidence on which ne relied was that he and his 
predecessors lumbered on the land, had surveys made and wood- 
roads cut. The Supreme Court of Canada, in affirming the judg­
ment of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, unanimously re­
jected the plaintiff’s claim. Davies, }., said:
23. (1904) 34 S.C .R . «27.
24. See the judgm ent of C arter, C. J. in H u m p h rey s  r .  H elm e s  i I Sii I ) 10 
N .B .R . '>9, and that of A rm our, J .  in S h e ¡ih erdsou x'. M cC u llo u gh  (1882) 
46 U .C .Q .B . 573 (both dissenting).
2'». W ood v. L eB la n c  (1904) 34 S.C .R . (*27; F a n e ii  v. P ejcpscot P u p a  C o m ­
pany et al (1933) 5  M .l’ .R . 261.
26. (1933) 6 M .l’ .R . 72.
27. ( 1904) 34 S .C .R . 627.
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Now. in my judgm ent, ilie possession necessary under a 
colourable title  to  ou.1t the title of the tru e ow ner m ust l>e 
just as op en, actu al, exclusive, continu ou s and notorious as 
when claim ed w ithout such colo u r, the only difference being 
that the actu al |X>sssesion of part is extended by construction  
to all the lands within th e boundaries of the deed but only  
•when a n d  w hile th ere  is tlint part occupa tio n. And before it 
can be exten d ed  it must exist and is only exten ded by co n ­
struction while it exists. It m ay be th at a person with co lo u r­
able title engaged in lum bering on land would be held w hite  
so en g a g ed  a n d  in actual occupation of part  to be in the  
constructive possession of all not actually adversely occupied  
even if that em braced  som e thousands of acres w ithin the  
bounds of his deed. B u t it is c lear to my m ind th at if and  
when such person w ithdraw s from  the possession of the p art  
by ceasing to carry  on the acts which gave him  possession 
th ere  he necessarily ceases to have constructive possession of 
the rest. His possession in o th er words m ust be an actu al co n ­
tinuous possession, at least of part.28
The court followed theD<\i Barres ease20 andSherren v. Pearson,™ 
in deciding that lumbering operations which are not continuous 
do not constitute actual possession of land.
The same conclusion was reached by the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal in Farren v. Pejepscot Paper Company et al 31 
where the facts were similar to those in Wood v. LeB lanc . The 
defendant company proved that lumbering operations had been 
carried out on the locus in quo five times during a period of 30 
years. Throughout the same period the defendant had employed 
a caretaker to inspect its properties including the locus in quo, 
to watch the boundary lines and to keep out trespassers. Again 
this evidence was not enough. Barry, C. J., said:
T h e  m ere acts of going on wilderness lands from  tim e to 
tim e, in this case five tim es in th irty -th ree years, in the  
absence of the ow ner and cu ttin g  logs, are  not such acts in 
them selves as would deprive the ow ner of his possession. Such 
acts are  m erely trespasses on the land against the tru e ow ner, 
whoever he m ay be, which any oth er in tru d er m ight 
com m it.32
The Court was not impressed by the caretaker’s evidence as he 
did not say that he actually knew the exact boundaries of the 
locus in quo and he only inspected the properties in the winter­
time.
A comparison of Wood v. LeBlanc and the Pejepscot case 
with the cases where colour of title has been applied shows that
28. I h id , at p. <>3.">.
29. (1842) 3 N .B .R . 595.
30. (1887) 14 S .C .R . 581.
51. (1933) 5 M .P .R . 261.
32. ¡h id ,  at p. 287.
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what the courts require before they will apply colour of title is 
an actual clearing of part of the locus in quo  and occupation of 
this cleared land bv cultivating it or living 011 it for tnc whole 
statutory period3*, if these things are shown then the courts arc 
much more willing to favour the possessory claimant. It is true 
that there are suggestions in the cases that lumbering while it is 
actually going 011 represents actual possession of the land, but 
there are 110 Canadian cases where lumbering alone has been 
sufficient and it is hard to see how it ever could be since by its 
verv nature it is not continuous.
After the cautious attitude displayed in Wood v. LeBlanc 
and the Pejepscot case, the decision of the Privv Council in Kirby 
v. C ouderoy:u comes somewhat as a shock. More than twentv 
years before the action the plaintiff conveyed certain wild lands 
in British Columbia to the defendant. The conveyance was abso­
lute in form but it was treated by the parties and accepted bv the 
court as a mortgage. The plaintiff sought recovery of tne land and 
was met bv the defence that as the defendant had been in poss­
ession of the land as mortgagee for more than twentv years the 
right to recovery was extinguished. The onlv evidence of possess­
ion bv the defendant was (1) by British Columbia law convey­
ances of land transferred to the grantee inter alia “possession” of 
the land itself; and (2) the defendant paid the taxes on the land 
for the statutory period. The Privv Council, reversing the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, found for the defendant. Lord Shaw 
of Dunfermline said:
It appears to  be established, in short, th at (1) for over 
tw enty years before the in stitution of this suit the app ellan t 
had, so far as this wild land was concerned, perform ed the  
only act of possession of which it app eared to be capable, 
nam ely, he had paid all the taxation  upon it; w hereas (2) the  
respondent was aw are that this was being done by the ap p el­
lant and he (th e respondent), so far from  anything even 
rem otely akin (<> adverse possession, had washed his hands of 
all connection w ith the p rop erty .5**
Although this ease is a decision of the Privy Council, it is 
certainlv open to grave doubt. None of the Canadian cases 011 
possessorv title to wilderness land was cited in the judgment or 
in the argument. Only one judgment was given and it is very 
brief. The fact that the respondent knew the taxes were being
33. f i d e :  Lessee of C u n a rd  v. Im in e  (I8.r>3) 2 N.S.R. 31; D oe d. H axter x>. 
H axter  (1858) 9  N .K .R . 131: H ey la n d  i>. Scott (1869) 19 U.C.C.l». 165; 
H u m p h rey s  H elm es  (1861) 10 N N .B .R . 59; Davis i>. H en d erso n  ( I869} 
29 l .C.Q.'n. 344; M ulltolhm d v. C onklin  (1 8 /2 )  22 U .C .C .P . 372: Stewart 
v. (.oss  (1933) 6  M l’ R. 72: and D rs Harres a n d  a n o th er  i>. Shey  (1873) 
29 I ..T . 392.
34. 11912) A.C. 599.
35. ¡h id . at pp. 602-3.
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paid and that he, to use the words of Lord Shaw, “washed his 
hands of all connection with the property” strongly influenced 
the court. But is the payment of taxes evidence or possession of 
land at all? A person pays taxes on land because he claims to own 
it, not bccause he is in possession. It is also difficult to see how 
the execution of the conveyance conferred possession upon the 
mortgagee as the usual practice in mortgage transactions is for 
the mortgagor to remain in possession.
W hile our courts have in a few cases applied the doctrine of 
colour of title, the limits of this doctrine have scarcely been ex­
plored. For example, can a possessor rely on the theory when the 
deed was received with knowledge that it is defective or that the 
grantor does not own the property? Must the defective document 
be a deed containing a metes and bounds description of the land 
intended to be conveyed? Must the deed be recorded? There have 
been American cases on all these points but no important Canad­
ian ones.
Generally speaking the cautious approach taken by our courts 
to the question of possessory title to wilderness lands suggests that 
thev would favour a narrow interpretation of the theory of colour 
of title. On the requirement of bona fides by the possessor, there 
is a dictum of Killam, J. in Wood v. LeBlanc saying that bona 
fides is an essential requirement.36 In all the cases cited above 
where colour of title has been applied, bona fides has existed.37 
The weight of American authority is in favour of bona fides.,n  
Apart from authority if the courts refuse to give any constructive 
effect to the acts of a treasurer, why should they give it to someone 
with colour of title who has actea in bad faith?
The cases do not deal at length with the question whether 
registration of the invalid deed is necessary or not. Halliburton, 
C. J., in Lessee of Cunard v. Irvine 39 thought it was unnecessary 
and the court in Stewart v. Goss40 decided that notice of the 
existence of the deed without actual registration is enough. In 
most of the cases where colour of title has been applied, however, 
the deed has been recorded. In the United States some cases say 
registration is not required and in some States the point is cover­
ed by legislation.41
3«. (1904) 34 S .Í..R . 627 at p. 047.
37. I'irlr: le s s e e  af C u n a rd  v. tw in e  (1853) 2  N .S.R . 31 ; D oe d. R n xter x>. 
lia xter  (I8 5 8 ) 9  N .B .R . 131; H ey la n d  v. Scott (1869) 19 U .C .C .P . 165; 
H u m p h rey s  v. H elm es  (1861) 10 N .B .R . 59 ; Dai'is i>. H en d erso n  (1809) 
29  r .C .Q .B . 344; M u lh o lh m d  v. C onklin  (1872) 22 U .C .C .P . 372; Sleivart 
v (.oss  (1933) 6  M .P .R . 72 ; and the tw o Privy C ouncil rases, D ts H a n es  
/ n d  a n o th er  v. Shey  (18773) 29  L .T . 392 and Kirl)y r>. C ow derox  r 1012] 
A.C. 599 .
38. See (1909-10) 23  H arv. L .R ev . 56.
39. (1853) 2  N .S.R . 31 at p. 34.
40. (1933) 6  M .P .R . 72.
41. See (1909-10) 23 H arv. L .R e v . 56,
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From a practical point of view strong reasons favour the 
requirement of registration. Is an owner who sees another occupy­
ing part of his land which is of little value and who decides to let 
the occupation continue for the statutory period to run the risk 
thereby of losing title to a much larger tract of land over which 
there arc 110 visible signs of occupation simply because the poss­
essor has an invalid deed to it? If the deed is not recorded the 
owner cannot find out how much land the possessor is claiming 
to occupy . And the mere fact that the owner knows the possessor 
has a deed is not noticed of its terms unless it is registered. Again, 
is a bona fide purchaser from the true owner to run the same risk?
Only if registration is not required does the question whether 
a description of the land in any sort of document will suffice arise. 
This point has not been discussed by our courts and in all cases 
where colour of title has been applied there has been a deed. The 
American courts have extended the doctrine so that a document of 
any sort containing a description of the land intended to be con­
veyed is sufficient.42 In some American cases the doctrine has 
even been extended to mere verbal descriptions of the land 
intended to be sold. These cases are, however, against the weight 
of American authority.43 This extension is hardly necessary or 
desirable today and it is unlikely that Canadian courts would 
adopt it.
Conclusion
The cases 011 possessory title to wilderness land show that 
the courts have made important concessions in favour of the poss­
essory claimant. They have recognized that wilderness land must 
be distinguished from cultivated land and that the evidence re­
quired to show an actual possession of the former is less than that 
required for cultivated land. Although mere woodcutting is not 
sufficient for this purpose, something less than clearing and en­
closing the wild land is. They have also adopted and applied the 
American theory of colour of title. Although these concessions 
have been narrowly interpreted and cautiously applied, their 
practical importance should not be overlooked when considering 
questions of possessory title.
42. See (1909-10) 23 H arv. L .R ev . :><>.
4$. Cf. T iffan ) T h e  Law  of Real P rop erty , 3rd  F.d„ vol. 4. pp. 4.->9-4f>2.
